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Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995)
I. INTRODUCTION
In Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton,' the United States Supreme
Court addressed whether a school district could impose random and
suspicionless urinalysis drug testing on high school student athletes.
The Court held that such testing did not violate students' Fourth
Amendment rights and was therefore constitutional. 2 In so deciding,
the Court vastly expanded the permissible realm of drug testing con-
texts beyond the limits defined in two earlier decisions, Skinner v. Na-
tional Railway Labor Executives Ass'n? and National Treasury Employees
Union v. Von Raab.4 In those cases, the Court previously stated that
the government could only transcend the Fourth Amendment re-
quirement of individualized suspicion where it had a compelling in-
terest at stake, namely a threat to public safety or national security.5
The Vernonia Court argued that, because high school athletes have
decreased expectations of privacy by virtue of their participation in
extracurricular athletics, the suspicionless drug testing was constitu-
tionally justified. 6
This Note argues that the Supreme Court overstepped the
boundaries of the Fourth Amendment in two ways: first, by finding
the interest of the Vernonia District in promulgating the drug testing
to be "compelling" given the paucity of the evidence of athletes using
drugs; and second, by holding that student athletes have diminished
privacy expectations solely due to the structure and requirements of
the athletic program. This Note concludes that the Supreme Court
reached its decision primarily for policy reasons, specifically the eradi-
cation of drug use among America's children. Although this reason is
1 115 S. C. 2886, 2396 (1995).
2 Hd at 2396.
3 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
4 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
5 Id. at 670; Skinner; 489 U.S. at 638.
6 115 S. C. at 2392-93.
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a noble one, it does not justify the consequence of eroding constitu-
tional privacy rights of children.
II. BACKGROUND
A. CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINS OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be vio-
lated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.7
The Fourth Amendment was drafted in reaction to the "general war-
rants" used in England, which allowed British officers to capriciously
search colonial homes and workplaces for criminal evidence, seditious
literature, or illegally imported goods.8
Countless Supreme Court cases recognize that the basic purpose
of the Fourth Amendment is to safeguard the privacy and security of
individuals against arbitrary invasions by government officials. These
cases harmonize with the well-established idea that the Fourth
Amendment gives concrete expression to a right of the people which
is "basic to a free society."
9
As indicated by the wording of the Fourth Amendment, "reasona-
bleness" is the ultimate measure of the constitutionality of a govern-
ment search. 10 Courts generally determine the "reasonableness" of a
search by a balancing test, though the conditions and prerequisites for
such a test depend on whether the search is conducted in a criminal
or administrative context.
B. INTERPRETATION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN THE CRIMINAL
CONTEXT
When law enforcement officials conduct a search to uncover evi-
dence of criminal wrongdoing, the "reasonableness" requirement of
the Fourth Amendment generally requires them to obtain a judicial
warrant." Where a warrant is required, the Warrant Clause of the
7 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
8 See generally Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 311 (1978); Frank v. Maryland,
359 U.S. 360, 363-65 (1959). The Frank Court stated, "The vivid memory by the newly
independent Americans of these abuses produced the Fourth Amendment as a safeguard
against such arbitrary action by officers of the new union...." Frank, 359 U.S. at 363.
9 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949).




Fourth Amendment 12 mandates that courts may not issue them with-
out probable cause.'3 Whether a warrant is always required, however,
has been a matter of judicial interpretation. Therefore, the Fourth
Amendment case law in the criminal context has delineated several
exceptions to the warrant requirement,' 4 indicating that the reasona-
bleness of a search does not require a warrant in all instances. 15
Initially, the Supreme Court required probable cause as a prereq-
uisite for a full-scale search in the criminal context, regardless of
whether such a search was conducted pursuant to a warrant or under
one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement. In the
context of warrantless searches, one of the first Supreme Court cases
to explicitly articulate this probable cause standard was Carroll v.
United States.16 The Carroll Court held that a warrantless search of a
car was unreasonable unless supported by some level of individualized
suspicion, namely probable cause, thus implying that such a search
conducted under individualized suspicion would be a valid exception
to the warrant requirement. 17 The Court did not base its conclusion
on the express probable cause requirement contained in the Warrant
Clause of the Fourth Amendment,18 but rather on the Framers' inter-
pretation of unreasonable searches, the interests of the public, and
the interests of individuals. 19 The Carroll Court declared further that
blanket, warrantless searches are "intolerable and unreasonable." 2
0
Later case law relaxed Carroll's strict probable cause requirement
in the area of warrantless criminal searches indicating that, where a
warrant is not required, probable cause is not necessary either.21 The
Supreme Court has stated that a criminal search not based on prob-
able cause will pass Fourth Amendment muster, "when special needs,
12 The Warrant Clause reads, ... no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
13 Id.
14 Most of the recognized exceptions to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement
arise when an exigent circumstance makes a warrantless search imperative to the safety of
the police and the community, McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948); other
possible exceptions include voluntary consent by the individual to be searched,
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973); the "plain view doctrine" by which an
officer can conduct a search if evidence of illegal activity is in "plain view," Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 449 (1971); and a search conducted incident to an arrest, Chimel v.
California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
15 Id.
16 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
.17 Jr& at 149.
18 For the text of the Warrant Clause, see supra note 12.
19 Carrol, 267 U.S. at 149.
20 Id. at 153-54. See also Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2398 (1995).
21 Vernonia, 115 S. Ct. at 2398.
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beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and
probable-cause requirement impracticable." 22  When deciding
whether such "special needs" exist, the Court balances the search's
intrusion upon individual interests against its promotion of legitimate
governmental interests.23
For example, in Terry v. Ohio,24 the Court relaxed the probable
cause requirement for a "minimally intrusive search" to something
short of probable cause.25 Specifically, the Court held that if a police
officer observes unusual behavior which suggests criminal activity,
then he may conduct a careful and limited search of the suspected
individual's outer clothing without a warrant. 26 One year later, consis-
tent with its decision in Terry, the Court enunciated an exception to
the warrant requirement for a criminal search conducted incident to
arrest.
2 7
C. INTERPRETATION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN THE
ADMINISTRATIVE CONTEXT
While both administrative and criminal searches are constitu-
tional if conducted pursuant to a warrant or probable cause as di-
rected by the Fourth Amendment, criminal searches differ from
administrative searches in two important respects. First, criminal
searches are conducted for the purpose of uncovering evidence re-
lated to criminal activity.2 8 Administrative searches, on the other
hand, are not conducted with the specific purpose of uncovering
criminal evidence, but rather are administered according to a policy
established by a politically accountable body that "sufficiently limit[s]
official discretion."29
Second, criminal searches are only constitutionally justified if
conducted pursuant to a warrant or under an exception to the war-
rant requirement, including probable cause.30 Thus, the probable
cause standard31 "is peculiarly related to criminal investigations" 32 and
is largely unhelpful in assessing the reasonableness of administrative
22 Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987).
23 Id. See also, e.g., United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616-619 (1977); United States
v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 439
(1973).
24 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
25 Id. at 30.
26 Id.
27 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
28 Acton v. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 23 F.3d 1514, 1520 (9th Cir. 1994).
29 Id. at 1520-21.
30 Acton, 23 F.3d at 1520.
31 See discussion supra at section I.B.
32 Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 371 (1987).
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searches.3 3 This is particularly true where the government conducts a
search to prevent the development of hazardous conditions or to de-
tect blanket violations, the existence of which do not generate articul-
able grounds or probable cause for searching any particular persons.4
Rather, in the administrative context, courts employ a balancing test
which weighs the government interest in conducting the search
against the individual privacy interests affected by the search.3 5
Hence, courts judge administrative searches by different standards
and balancing tests than criminal searches.
The Supreme Court first recognized that a government official
possessed the authority to conduct an administrative search in Camara
v. Municipal Court.3 6 In Camara, an apartment occupant denied access
to a housing inspector investigating housing code violations without a
warrant.3 7 The Supreme Court applied a balancing test, weighing the
public needs furthered by the proposed search, namely the elimina-
tion of hazardous housing code violations, against the invasion of the
occupant's privacy.38 The Court then concluded that the inspector's
intended search was reasonable, and thus constitutional.3 9 The Court
based its conclusion on the finding that inspectors could not detect
building code violations, such as faulty wiring, from the outside; con-
sequently inspections were necessary to ensure public safety.40 In ren-
dering its decision, however, the Court emphasized that
administrative searches significantly intrude upon individual privacy
interests; therefore, where no emergency exists, the Court mandated
that the entity conducting the search either procure a warrant or con-
duct the search pursuant to one of the other recognized exceptions to
the warrant requirement. 4'
Twelve years later, in Delaware v. Prouse,42 the Supreme Court clar-
33 Id.; O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 723 (1987). Moreover, this standard has been
somewhat relaxed in the criminal context, see discussion supra at section I.B.
34 National Treasury Employees Union vs. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 668 (1989); Camara
v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 535-36 (1967).
35 Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 628 (1989). For more on
this balancing test, see supra section El.D and II.E.
36 387 U.S. 523, 535 (1967).
37 Id. at 526. The apartment manager had informed the inspector that the apartment
occupant, Camara, was using the ground floor of the building for his personal residence in
violation of his occupancy permit. The inspector demanded access to inspect, and Camara
refused him access without a search warrant. Id.
38 Id. at 537.
39 Id.
4 Id.
41 I. at 534, 540. The Court stated that the warrant requirement guarantees that the
government has a reasonable need to search an individual's home. Id For exceptions to
the warrant requirement, see supra note 14.
42 440 U.S. 648 (1979). Prouse involved a police officer who randomly stopped a vehicle
19961 1269
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ified the Camara balancing test. The Court enunciated four factors for
courts to balance when determining the reasonableness of an admin-
istrative search: (1) the importance of the governmental interest; (2)
the physical or psychological intrusion upon the individual's privacy
interests; (3) the amount of discretion exercised by the official con-
ducting the search; and (4) the effectiveness and necessity of the in-
trusion in reaching law enforcement goals. 43
As discussed below, courts have consistently applied the four fac-
tors in Prouse as part of a general balancing test, either in total or in
part, when they have assessed the reasonableness of administrative
searches in public schools and in the workplace.
D. ADMINISTRATIVE SEARCHES IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS
The Supreme Court has utilized a balancing test approach, simi-
lar to that used in Prouse, for administrative searches in a public school
context. The Court first adopted such a test in New Jersey v. T.L. O.44
In T.L. 0., a principal searched a student's purse upon a teacher's re-
port that the student had been smoking cigarettes in the high school
bathroom.45 The search uncovered a small amount of marijuana and
drug paraphernalia.46 In assessing the applicability of the Fourth
Amendment warrant requirement, the Court agreed with the school
district that a warrant requirement would frustrate the school's "swift
and informal disciplinary procedures."47 The Court reasoned that, in
assessing the constitutionality of such a search, courts must balance
the student's privacy interests against school officials' interests in
maintaining discipline on school grounds.48 Applying this balancing
test, the Court held that, because schoolchildren have legitimate pri-
vacy expectations, school officials could not search students without
some individualized suspicion of wrongdoing.49 The Court reached
even though he lacked reasonable suspicion that anyone in the vehicle had broken a law or
committed a traffic violation. Because the officer did not stop the car based on a suspicion
of criminal activity, the search clearly was not a criminal search, but rather an administra-
tive search conducted by the police department to check drivers' licenses and automobile
registrations. The Court held that stopping the vehicle and detaining the driver was unrea-
sonable because the officer did not have an articulable and reasonable suspicion. The
significance of this holding is that, by stating that an administrative search could also be
reasonable when based upon an individualized suspicion of wrongdoing, the Court ex-
panded the exceptions to the warrant requirement for administrative searches.
43 Id. at 655-60.
44 469 U.S. 325 (1989).
45 Id. at 328.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 340.




its holding through a twofold inquiry. First, it asked whether the
search was justified at its inception. In other words, the Court investi-
gated whether school officials had reasonable grounds for suspecting
that the search would reveal evidence of rule violations. Second, the
Court asked whether the search was reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances justifying the school's interference in the first place,
meaning that the school's measures were not excessively intrusive.50
The Court concluded that a reasonableness test consisting of the
aforementioned inquiry, coupled with the requirement of individual-
ized suspicion, would neither overburden school officials in their ef-
forts to preserve school discipline nor authorize "unrestrained
intrusions" into students' realms of privacy.51
E. FOURTH AMENDMENT APPLIED TO DRUG TESTING "SEARCHES" IN THE
WORKPLACE
The Supreme Court first addressed the constitutionality of work-
place drug testing in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n,52 hold-
ing that employers may not bypass the warrant or probable cause
requirements of the Fourth Amendment without showing "special
needs."53 In other words, the Court stated that a suspicionless search
can only be reasonable where the individual privacy interests affected
are minimal and where the intrusion upon those privacy interests fur-
thers a compelling government interest that would be jeopardized by
an individualized suspicion requirement 54 Applying these rules, the
Skinner Court determined that the government had a "compelling"
public safety interest in drug testing railroad employees where evi-
dence linked twenty-one major train accidents to employee drug
use.55 Furthermore, the Court found that railroad employees held
significantly lower privacy expectations due to their participation in a
highly regulated industry with the potential to seriously impact public
safety.56 The Court therefore held the drug testing constitutional. 57
Following Skinner, the Supreme Court decided National Treasury
Employees Union v. Von Raab,58 which involved random urinalysis drug
testing of United States Customs employees who carried firearms and
investigated drug interdiction. In holding the testing to be constitu-
50 Id at 341.
51 Ik at 342-43.
52 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
53 Id. at 624.
54 Id. at 628.
55 Id. at 607.
56 Id. at 633.
57 Id.
58 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
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tional, the Court found that the government had a "compelling" need
in drug testing the employees in order to ensure their effectiveness in
stopping drug smugglers, as well as to protect national security
interests.59
F. RANDOM, SUSPICIONLESS DRUG TESTING IN SCHOOLS
After Skinner and Von Raab, only compelling public safety or na-
tional security concerns justified random, suspicionless drug testing in
the workplace. Until Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, the Supreme
Court had never before addressed the constitutionality of drug testing
in the public school setting, and few lower courts had addressed the
issue. The few courts that had addressed this issue relied upon the
Skinner, Von Raab, and T.L. 0. precedents to hold that combating drug
use is not a sufficiently "compelling" interest to make random, suspi-
cionless school drug testing reasonable.60
For example, the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Texas in Brooks v. East Chambers Consol. Ind. Sch. Dist.61 held
a school drug testing program 62 unconstitutional because the school
failed to demonstrate a "compelling" need. 63 The court relied upon
Skinner and Von Raab in arguing that students in extracurricular activi-
ties do not pose the same risks to public safety or national security as
do railroad or customs employees. 64 The court also discussed T.L.O.
in reasoning that, ordinarily, a school official must have individualized
suspicion that a student has engaged in wrongdoing before searching
that student. 65 Accordingly, the court balanced the students' privacy
interests against the legitimate, but not compelling, interests of the
government to combat drug use and found the suspicionless urinalysis
testing unreasonable. 66
59 Id- at 670-71.
60 See Moule v. Paradise Valley Unified Sch. Dist. No. 69, 863 F. Supp. 1098 (D. Ariz.
1994) (holding unconstitutional random, suspicionless urinalysis testing of high school
athletes); University of Colorado v. Derdeyn, 863 P.2d 929 (Col. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.
Ct. 1646 (1994) (holding that random urinalysis testing of college athletes violated the
Fourth Amendment).
61 730 F. Supp. 759 (S.D. Tex. 1989), aff'd., 930 F.2d 915 (5th Cir. 1991).
62 The testing program in Brooks was similar to that at issue in Vernonia, requiring stu-
dents in extracurricular activities to submit to urinalysis drug testing.
63 l& at 764. The school superintendent knew of only two occasions where substance
abuse disrupted an extracurricular activity, and both occasions involved alcohol. Id. More-
over, the school had employed a drug-sniffing dog which failed to uncover any drugs at the
school. Id. at 761.
64 let at 766.
65 Id. at 764.
66 Id. at 764-65. The court further asserted that the drug testing policy at issue would
essentially provide school officials with an "across the board, eagle eye examination of per-
sonal information of almost every child in the school district." Ide at 765. This "global goal"
1272 [Vol. 86
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III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. BACKGROUND
The town of Vernonia, Oregon is a small, isolated logging com-
munity of approximately 3,000 residents.67 Petitioner Vernonia
School District 47J ("District") consists of one high school and three
grade schools with a total enrollment of approximately 690 students.68
Because of the town's small size and isolated location, school athletics
play a prominent role, and the community greatly admires student
athletes.69
Between sixty and sixty-five percent of high school students and
approximately seventy-five percent of elementary students participate
in one of the District's seven extracurricular sports activities. 70 To par-
ticipate in District athletics, students must have a physical examina-
tion, medical insurance, and written parental consent.7' In addition,
all students must maintain grade requirements and comply with the
athletic program's rules of conduct.72
B. THE PERCEIVED DRUG PROBLEM
Prior to the mid-1980s, the District experienced few drug-related
problems.7" In the mid-to-late 1980s, however, the District's teachers
and administrators perceived what they believed to be an increase in
drug use.74 Reports accumulated of students using drugs, teachers
confiscating drug paraphernalia on school grounds, and student ad-
missions of illegal drug use.75 This increase in drug use accompanied
of deterring drug use generally did not justify the random drug testing. Id at 766.
67 Brief for Respondent at 1, Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386
(1995) (No. 94-590).
68 Brief for Petitioner at 3, Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995)
(No. 94-590).
69 Vemonia School District 47J v. Acton, 115 S. CL 2386, 2388 (1995).
70 Petitioner's Brief at 3, Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J (No. 94-590). Sports offered in the
Vemonia District include football, basketball, cross-country, track, volleyball, wrestling, and
golf.
71 Id. at 4.
72 Id.
73 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 115 S. Ct. at 2388.
74 Id. Evidence of drug use consisted primarily of second-hand reports by school offi-
cials of students romanticizing drugs in writing assignments and hallway conversations.
Only one teacher testified at trial that she had actually observed drug use, stating that she
had witnessed a student smoking what appeared to be a marijuana joint. Respondent's
Brief at 3, Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J (No. 94-590).
75 Petitioner's Brief at 5, Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J (No. 94-590). The District Court found
evidence of a "drug culture" consisting of student organizations with names like the "Big
Elks" or the "Drug Cartel." Loud "bugling" and "head butting" were the trademark activi-
ties of such groups. There was no evidence, however, that any "Elk" or "Cartelian" had
actually used drugs or that drugs were the reason why these groups behaved as they did.
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a corresponding increase in disciplinary problems.76 Between 1988
and 1989, the number of disciplinary referrals within the District
more than doubled as students became increasingly rude and disrup-
tive in class. 77
The District perceived that student athletes were significantly in-
volved in the drug problem.78 School administrators caught student
athletes using alcohol and drugs, several athletes admitted to drug
use, and administrators noted a glorification of drug use within the
athletic program. 79 In the mid-to-late 1980s, the athletic coaches at-
tributed an increase in the number of athletic injuries to drug use.80
One instance of a suspected drug-related athletic injury involved a
high school wrestler who suffered a sternum injury.8 ' Additionally,
the football coach witnessed several safety procedure omissions and
miss-executions by football players, all of which he attributed to drug
use.
8 2
In the late 1980s, the District concluded that it had a drug prob-
lem among the general student body as well as among student ath-
letes.83 As a result, the District took steps to address the problem.8 4
The District first attempted to alleviate the drug problem through spe-
cial classes and presentations on the dangers of drugs.8 5 Second, in
conjunction with the City Council, the District hired a police officer to
patrol the area near the high school for drug activities.86 Third, the
District brought in a drug-sniffing dog to search student lockers for
Respondent's Brief at 3, Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J (No. 94-590).
76 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 115 S. Ct. at 2388.
77 1& at 2388. There was no evidence that drug use caused this increase in disciplinary
referrals. Furthermore, one student could have multiple referrals so the reported number
of referrals does not necessarily corroborate the number of misbehaving students. Respon-
dent's Brief at 4-5, Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J (No. 94-590).
78 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 115 S. Ct. at 2389.
79 Petitioner's Brief at 6, Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J (No. 94-590).
80 Id. The District never confirmed any drug-related athletic injuries. Respondent's
Brief at 6-7, Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J (No. 94-590).
81 The wrestling coach, Pat Svenson, testified that a high school student sustained in-
jury in an "away" match when he failed to react as quickly as the coach would have pre-
ferred to a hold that his opponent put on him. Respondent's Brief at 7 n.8, Vernonia Sch.
Dist. 47J (No. 94-590). The next day, Svenson thought that he smelled marijuana in a hotel
room occupied by the injured wrestler and three other students, but he never identified
specifically that the injured wrestler had been smoking marijuana. Id.
82 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47j, 115 S. Ct. at 2389. Svenson, who also coaches football, testified
that while watching some football game films, he noted that some of the players did not
react to situations as he had taught them, making him wonder if drugs were to blame.
Svenson never confirmed this suspicion. Respondent's Brief at 7 n.8, Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J
(No. 94-590).
83 Respondent's Brief at 1, Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J (No. 94-590).
84 Jd
85 Petitioner's Brief at 8, Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J (No. 94-590).
86 Id.
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drugs.8 7 None of these measures proved effective, however, and the
drug and disciplinary problems continued.88 This led the District to
investigate drug testing programs by studying such programs in other
districts and soliciting legal advice.89 The District held an "input
night" for parents regarding the proposed drug testing, and attending
parents gave their unanimous support.90
C. THE DRUG-TESTING PROGRAM
As a result of both the District's investigative findings and paren-
tal support, the school board approved the implementation of a drug
testing policy in the fall of 1989.91 The policy's express purposes were
to prevent drug use among student athletes, to protect athletes'
health and safety, and to provide assistance and counseling programs
to drug users.92
Under the drug testing policy, students wishing to participate in
interscholastic athletics must sign a consent form with their parents
agreeing to participate in the random, suspicionless drug testing pro-
gram.93 School officials initially tested student athletes at the begin-
ning of the athletic season.94 During the season, the District
randomly tested athletes, one each week of the season. The District
assigned numbers to all athletes participating in the sport and placed
87 Respondent's Brief at 1, Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J (No. 94-590).
88 Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2388 (1995). The district
court confirmed the Vernonia District's desperation to alleviate the perceived drug prob-
lem: "Disciplinary actions had reached 'epidemic proportions.' The coincidence of an
almost three-fold increase in classroom disruptions and disciplinary reports along with the
staff s direct observations of students using drugs or glamorizing drug or alcohol use led
the administration to the inescapable conclusion that... unless it took immediate action,
the problem was going to get far worse and widespread before it got better...." Acton v.
Vernonia Sch. Dist 47J, 796 F. Supp. 1354, 1357 (D. Ore. 1992).
89 Petitioner's Brief at 8, Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J (No. 94-590). The District Superinten-
dent admitted in an interrogatory that the District did not know what percentage of stu-
dent athletes took illegal drugs, and the District made no effort to find out this statistic
before implementing its drug testing policy. Respondent's Brief at 8, Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J
(No. 94-590).
90 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47j, 115 S. Ct. at 2389.
91 Id
92 It. The original drug testing program operated from September 1989 to August
1990 and applied to any student participating in extracurricular activities, athletic or non-
athletic. The District later amended the Policy to test only athletes in order to "assure its
legality." Respondents assert that this policy change may have been motivated by financial
concerns. The District had been receiving $7,500 a year under a 1986 congressional act
authorizing federal grants to local schools for, among other things, random drug testing of
student athletes. If the District had therefore maintained its original policy, it would not
have remained eligible for funds. Respondent's Brief at 9 n.9, Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J (No.
94-590).
93 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47j, 115 S. Ct. at 2389.
94 Id.
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those numbers in a "pool," where a student, supervised by two adults,
drew 10% of the numbers each week for testing.95 School officials
notified those selected and tested them on that same day, if possible. 96
In the initial stages of the testing process, a selected student be-
gins the test by completing a specimen control form which assigns
him a number.97 The student must identify any prescription medica-
tions that he or she is taking by providing a copy of the prescription or
a doctor's note.98 The student then enters an empty locker room ac-
companied by an adult testing monitor of the same sex. 99 With male
students, each boy selected produces his sample at a urinal, remaining
fully clothed and with his back to the monitor, who remains standing
twelve to fifteen feet behind the student. 100 Under the Policy as writ-
ten, the monitor may watch the student while he produces the sample,
although at no time are the student's genitals observed by the moni-
tor.10' The procedure for girls differs in that the student produces
the sample in an enclosed bathroom stall, so that the monitor does
not observe the sample production but listens for the normal sounds
of urination. 10 2 After producing the sample, the student gives it to the
monitor who checks it for temperature and signs of tampering and
then seals the sample, instructing the student to initial the seal. 10 3
The entire procedure takes approximately five minutes.104
The samples are then sent to an independent laboratory for test-
ing under security precautions designed to protect the chain of pos-
session and safeguard access to test results. 10 5 The laboratory tests the
samples for amphetamines, cocaine, and marijuana'0 6 and has an ac-
curacy rate of approximately 99.94%.107 The District may request
screening for other drugs, such as LSD, but the identity of a particular
student does not determine which drugs will be tested. s08 The labora-
tory does not know the names of the students who submit samples.
Only the District superintendent, principals, vice-principals, and ath-
95 Petitioner's Brief at 9, Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47] (No. 94-590).
96 Id.




101 Petitioner's Brief at 10, Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J (No. 94-590).
102 Id.
103 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47, 115 S. Ct. at 2389.
104 _T&
105 Id.
106 Alcohol and steroids are not on the list of tested substances. Respondent's Brief at 9,





letic directors have access to test results and student names, which are
kept on file for one year.'0 9
If a sample tests positive, the District administers a second test as
soon as possible to confirm the result.110 If the second sample tests
negative, the District takes no further action."' If the second sample
tests positive, the school principal notifies the student's parents and
conducts a hearing with the student and his parents." 2 At this hear-
ing, the principal presents the student with two options: (1) participa-
tion in a drug assistance program and a weekly drug test for six weeks
or, (2) suspension from athletics for the remainder of the current sea-
son as well as the following season." 3 Regardless of the chosen op-
tion, the student is re-tested prior to the beginning of the next eligible
athletic season. 14 A second "offense" mandates automatic suspension
for the remainder of the current athletic season as well as the follow-
ing season. A third "offense" results in suspension for the next two
seasons. 115
D. THE CASE
In the fall of 1991, respondent James Acton, a seventh-grader,
signed up for football at a District grade school." 6 The District de-
nied him participation because James and his parents refused to sign
the drug testing consent form, believing it to be a violation ofJames'
privacy and civil rights.11 7 The Actons filed suit in state court on
James' behalf seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from enforce-
ment of the Policy on the grounds that it violates the Fourth and Four-
teenth Amendments of the United States Constitution" 8 and Article
I, section 9 of the Oregon Constitution. 19
109 Id. Aside from those officials specifically designated in the Policy, other officials in-
volved in the ensuing due process hearing, counseling programs, and weekly repeat tests
could conceivably find out if a student tested positive. Respondent's Brief at 10, Vernonia
Sch. Dist. 47J (No. 94-590).
110 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47j, 115 S. Ct. at 2390.
III Id.
112 Petitioner's Brief at 11, Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J (No. 94-590).
113 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47, 115 S. Ct. at 2390.
"14 Id.
115 Respondent's Brief at 10, Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J (No. 94-590).
116 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47, 115 S. Ct. at 2890.
117 Id. The court of appeals found that, "[n]o evidence suggest[s] that James has ever
used drugs or that the District had any reason to suspect that he has." Acton v. Vernonia
Sch. Dist. 47J, 23 F.3d 1514, 1517 (9th Cir. 1994).
118 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47, 115 S. CL at 2390. The Actons also alleged that the District
lacked the statutory authority to adopt and enforce the Policy. The district court, however,
held that the District had the requisite authority. Acton v. Vernonia Sch. Dist., 796 F.
Supp. 1354, 1367 (D.Or. 1994).
119 Almost identical to the Federal Constitution, the Oregon Constitution provides:
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In a bench trial, the district court applied a balancing test that
weighed James Acton's right to privacy against the District's interest in
adopting the program and concluded that the Policy was reason-
able. 20 In support of its holding, the court determined that the Dis-
trict had a "compelling need" for the program because of the
following factors: (1) coaches had observed instances of unsafe ath-
letic performance by students presumably under the influence of
drugs; (2) insofar as athletes are role models within their schools and
within the community, deterring their drug use would deter other stu-
dents' drug use; (3) the District had attempted to alleviate the drug
problem using other means before implementing the Policy; (4) the
District narrowly tailored the Policy's scope to effectuate its stated
objectives; (5) the District took significant steps to limit the extent of
the Policy's intrusion; (6) coaches and administrators do not exercise
any discretion under the Policy; and (7) courts have historically de-
ferred to school administrators in disciplinary matters at the middle
and high school level.' 21 The district court thus concluded that the
Policy did not violate either the United States or the Oregon Constitu-
tions and entered an order denying the claims for injunctive and de-
claratory relief, as well as a judgment dismissing the action.122
The Actons appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit, which reversed the judgment of the district court,
holding that the Policy violated the Fourth Amendment as well as Arti-
cle I, Section 9 of the Oregon Constitution. 123 On the merits, the
court applied a balancing test and found that student athletes have
significant privacy rights.' 2 4 The court concluded that, although the
District had "worthy goals" of preventing needless athletic injuries,
deterring drug use, and improving discipline, these goals did not
amount to the "extreme dangers and hazards" involved in prior cases
authorizing random urinalysis testing. Therefore, the court found
that the District's interest was not "compelling enough" to support
such testing.125
The District filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to the United
States Supreme Court. On November 28, 1994, the Court granted
"[n]o law shall violate the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable search, or seizure; and no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause, supported by oath, or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the person or thing to be seized." OR. CoNsr., art. I, s.9.
120 Acton, 796 F. Supp. at 1365.
121 Id. at 1363-65.
122 Id
123 Acton v. Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 23 F.3d 1514, 1526 (9th Cir. 1994).
124 Id. at 1525.
125 M at 1526.
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certiorari to determine whether the Vemonia School District's drug
testing policy violates the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution.1 26
IV. SUMMARY OF OPINIONS
A. MAJORITY OPINION
The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit and remanded the case for further proceedings
consistent with the Court's holding. This holding stated that the
Vernonia School District's drug testing policy did not violate students'
federal or state constitutional rights to be free from unreasonable
searches.' 2 7 Justice Scalia,' 28 delivering the majority opinion of the
Court, began with a discussion of Fourth Amendment precedent. 29
Justice Scalia outlined the two-pronged balancing test for the reasona-
bleness of Fourth Amendment searches developed in Skinner v. Na-
tional Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n. °30 The Skinner test balances a
search's intrusion on an individual's Fourth Amendment interests
against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests.' 3 ' Apply-
ing the Skinner balancing test, Justice Scalia concluded that the
Vemonia School District's drug testing policy was constitutionally
reasonable.' 3 2
1. History of Drug Testing Under the Fourth Amendment
Justice Scalia laid the foundation for his legal analysis by discuss-
ing previous Supreme Court cases involving drug testing programs
and the Fourth Amendment. 3 3 He began by stating the Court's prior
holdings that the Fourth Amendment extends its constitutional guar-
antees to searches and seizures by state officers, including public
school officials.' 34 Justice Scalia noted that this case law supports the
idea that the government does not always need a warrant or probable
cause to establish the reasonableness of its searches: "[a] search un-
supported by probable cause can be constitutional, we have said,
126 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2388 (1995).
127 Id. at 2396.
128 Justices Rehnquist, Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyerjoined injustice Scalia's
opinion.
129 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 115 S. Ct. at 2390.
130 Skinner v. National Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989). See
text, supra at section II.E, for a detailed description of Skinner and its balancing test.
131 Id.
132 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 115 S. Ct. at 2396.
133 Id. at 2390.
134 Id. See also Skinner, 489 U.S. at 617; National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,
489 U.S. 656, 665 (1989); NewJersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 336-37 (1985).
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'when special needs, beyond the need for normal law enforcement,
make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable."" 3 5
Justice Scalia stated that, under New Jersey v. T.L.O., such "special
needs" exist in the public school context where a warrant requirement
would significantly impair both the school's ability to impose swift dis-
cipline and the teachers' capacity to maintain order. 36
2. Magnitude of the Privacy Interests Affected By the Policy
Justice Scalia then addressed the Skinner test for the reasonable-
ness of a Fourth Amendment search. Under Skinner, a court is re-
quired to balance the degree of the search's intrusion into an
individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the legitimacy of the
governmental interest furthered by the search.13 7 Justice Scalia first
turned his attention to the nature of the privacy interest at stake in
Vernonia. Justice Scalia stated that prior cases establish that constitu-
tionally protected privacy includes only those privacy interests which
society recognizes as "legitimate." 38 Moreover, the legitimacy of an
individual's privacy expectation varies within different contexts.13 9
Justice Scalia noted that, regarding the legitimacy of the students' pri-
vacy expectations impacted by the Vernonia Policy, two factors are dis-
positive. 140 First, the Policy targets unemancipated minors who have
traditionally lacked some fundamental rights of self-determination.' 41
Second, these unemancipated minors have been committed by their
parents to the temporary custody of the State which consequently acts
as schoolmaster in loco parentis.142 Thus, although the case law does
not mandate that children "shed their constitutional rights.., at the
schoolhouse gate,"143 the nature of a school's power is "custodial and
tutelary, permitting a degree of supervision and control that could not
be exercised over free adults."' 44 Hence, Justice Scalia reasoned,
prior Court decisions have recognized that schoolchildren have de-
creased privacy expectations and, conversely, that school officials have
a fairly wide degree of latitude in maintaining discipline.' 45
135 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47j, 115 S. Ct. at 2390 (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868,
873 (1987)).
136 Id. at 2391 (quoting T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340).
137 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 617.
138 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 338.




143 Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506
(1969).




Justice Scalia continued his inquiry into the privacy expectations
in Vernonia by contending that student athletes have lower expecta-
tions of privacy than do their non-athlete peers.146 These decreased
privacy expectations result from such factors as the "communal un-
dress" in the locker room and the requirement that athletes "suit up"
and shower after every game.147 Furthermore, by choosing to try out
for the team, student athletes agree to subject themselves to certain
regulations such as maintaining their grades and complying with gen-
eral "rules of conduct." Therefore, Justice Scalia believed that these
athletes have reason to expect intrusions upon their right to
privacy. 148
Having concluded his discussion of the scope of the legitimate
privacy expectations at stake, Justice Scalia turned to a discussion of
the character of the Policy's intrusion.149 Justice Scalia stated that
prior cases have emphasized that urinalysis testing intrudes upon a
bodily function "traditionally shielded by great privacy." 150 He enun-
ciated that the degree of this intrusion depends upon two things:
first, the manner in which the production of the urine sample is moni-
tored; and second, the information that the urinalysis discloses con-
cerning the state of the subject's body.15' Applying the Vernonia
School District Policy to the first factor, Scalia emphasized that the
conditions for monitoring urine production under the Policy, with
male students remaining fully clothed with their backs to the
monitors, and female students producing samples in an enclosed stall,
are markedly similar to the conditions found in ordinary public
restrooms and are therefore unobjectionable. 152
Regarding the second standard, Justice Scalia emphasized that
the Policy does not screen for medical conditions other than drug use,
such as epilepsy or diabetes, the types of drugs screened do not vary
according to the students' identities, and the lab discloses the results
to a limited class of school personnel. 53 Furthermore, Justice Scalia
stated that according to precedent, the Policy's requirement that stu-
dents disclose prescription medications is not per se unreasonable or
a "significant invasion of privacy."154 Taking the aforementioned fac-
146 Id
147 Schaill ex reL Kross v. Tippecanoe County School Corp., 864 F.2d 1309, 1318 (7th Cir.
1988).
148 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 115 S. Ct. at 2393.
149 Id.
150 Skinner v. National Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 626 (1989).
151 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J 115 S. Ct. at 2393.
152 Id.
155 I3
154 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 626 n.7.
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tors into account, Justice Scalia concluded that the invasion of privacy
under the Policy was insignificant.155
3. Magnitude of Governmental Interests Furthered By the Policy
Finally, Justice Scalia discussed the second prong of the Skinner
test: the nature and immediacy of the governmental interests at issue
and the efficacy of the chosen means for achieving those interests.' 5 6
In Skinner and Von Raab, the Court stated that the governmental inter-
est motivating a drug testing program must be "compelling."157 Jus-
tice Scalia stated that an interest is "compelling" if it "is important
enough to justify the particular search at hand, in light of other fac-
tors that show the search to be relatively intrusive upon a genuine
expectation of privacy." 158
Justice Scalia cited several justifications for the "compelling" na-
ture of the District's interests and supported these justifications with
expert opinions.15 9 First, Justice Scalia stated that school-age children
are particularly vulnerable to the physical, psychological, and addic-
tive effects of drugs.' 60 Second, he noted that rampant student drug
use threatens the entire student body and the educational process.' 6'
Third, Justice Scalia emphasized that parents entrust their schoolchil-
dren to the District which then has a "special responsibility" to those
children.' 62 Finally, Justice Scalia pointed to the fact that the District
narrowly tailored its Policy to student athletes because of their height-
ened injury risk resulting from drug use during sports activities. 163
As to the immediacy of the concerns at issue, Justice Scalia relied
on the district court's judgment that the Vernonia School District's
concerns are not only "compelling," but are also "immediate." 64 Jus-
tice Scalia commented that student drug use is an immediate crisis of
even greater proportions than existed in Skinner, where the Court up-
held the Government's drug testing program based on drug use by
railroad workers. Because the Vernonia drug problem warranted im-
mediate attention, the Court deferred to the District Court's findings
155 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 115 S. Ct. at 2394.
156 Id.
157 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 638; National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S.
656, 670 (1989).
158 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 115 S. Ct. at 2394.








as these findings were not clearly erroneous.' 65
Lastly, Justice Scalia emphasized that the District's chosen means
for achieving its goals were sufficiently efficacious to pass constitu-
tional muster. Justice Scalia noted particularly the fact that the gen-
eral Vernonia student body emulated student athletes. Justice Scalia
determined that a drug testing program targeting these role models
was likely to positively affect the rest of the student body.166 Justice
Scalia disregarded the possibility that the District could have em-
ployed less intrusive means for achieving its goal, namely testing only
on suspicion of drug use, because the Court has "repeatedly refused
to declare that only the 'least intrusive' search practicable can be rea-
sonable under the Fourth Amendment."' 67
In conclusion,Justice Scalia stated that the Vernonia Policy is rea-
sonable and therefore constitutional in light of student athletes' de-
creased privacy expectations, the relative unobtrusiveness of the
search, and the importance of the governmental needs addressed by
the Policy.' 68 Justice Scalia added one caveat cautioning against the
assumption that suspicionless drug testing will always pass constitu-
tional muster.' 69 Justice Scalia stated that the fact that the District un-
dertook to further governmental responsibilities in the public school
context as guardian of the children entrusted to its care tilted the
scales in its favor. Hence, Justice Scalia cautioned that lower courts
should narrowly interpret the Vernonia Court's holding in light of its
factual context. 170
B. JUSTICE GINSBURG'S CONCURRENCE
Justice Ginsburg wrote separately to address the limited nature of
the majority holding. Justice Ginsburg noted that Justice Scalia re-
peatedly referred to the fact that the Vernonia School District's Policy
targeted only students who voluntarily chose to participate in inter-
scholastic athletics and thus, the mostsevere sanction under the Pol-
icy was suspension from athletic participation.' 71 Cautioning against a
broader reading of the holding, Justice Ginsburg cited a Second Cir-
cuit case, United States v. Edwards,'72 in support of her view that the
165 Id.
166 Id. at 2396.
167 Itd; Skinner v. National Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 629 n.9
(1989).
168 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2396 (1995).
169 I&
170 Id.
171 Id. at 2397 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
172 498 F.2d 496, 500 (2d Cir. 1974) (in contrast to a search without notice and opportu-
nity to avoid examination, airplane passengers can avoid baggage searches by choosing not
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majority opinion reserves the question of whether a district could im-
pose routine drug tests on all students attending school, given that
those students are required by law to attend school and therefore do
not act voluntarily. 17
C. JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S DISSENT
Writing for the dissent, 74 Justice O'Connor stated that the
Vernonia School District must require reasonable suspicion in order
to maintain the constitutionality of its drug testing program. 75 Justice
O'Connor attacked the majority opinion on four fronts: first, the neg-
ative policy implications of the majority holding; second, the incon-
gruity between the majority decision and the history of the Court's
holdings in the Fourth Amendment context; third, the majority's mis-
application of the Skinner balancing test; and finally, the paucity of
evidence supporting the drug testing program in the first place.
1. Policy Implications of the Majority Opinion
Writing in dissent, Justice O'Connor stated, that according to the
reasoning of the majority opinion, the nation's school districts could
routinely subject millions of children participating in extracurricular
athletics to intrusive bodily searches even when the majority of those
children exhibited no symptoms of drug use.176 Justice O'Connor
stated further that the majority based its opinion primarily upon two
incomplete and unsatisfactory policy grounds: first, that because
every athlete is tested, school officials will not act arbitrarily; and sec-
ond, that a broad-based search policy dilutes the accusatory nature of
the search. 177 Justice O'Connor argued that these narrowly focused
justifications obscure countervailing policy concerns supporting the
opposite result.' 78
Justice O'Connor provided one such countervailing policy con-
cern: that blanket searches "pos[e] a greater threat to liberty" than do
suspicion-based searches because they affect so many people. 179 Jus-
tice O'Connor stated that the majority overlooked a distinct benefit of
to travel by airplane).
'73 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 115 S. Ct. at 2397 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citing Edwards,
498 F.2d 496, 500 (2d Cir. 1974) (Friendly, J.)).
174 Justices Stevens and Souter joined in Justice O'Connor's dissent.
175 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2398 (1995) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
176 Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
177 Id, (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
178 Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).




suspicion-based searches, namely that potential search targets exert a
substantial degree of control and can essentially avoid being tested by
not acting in a suspicious way.180 Justice O'Connor further explained
her dissent by stating that the Court's prior opinions have upheld sus-
picionless testing only where a suspicion-based regime would be inef-
fective, a situation that is not present in Vernonia.181
2. History of Fourth Amendment Searches
Next, Justice O'Connor discussed the jurisprudential trend view-
ing warrantless, blanket searches as intolerable and unreasonable in
the criminal context and concluded that the majority holding contra-
dicted historical precedent. In arguing this proposition, Justice
O'Connor discussed Carroll v. United States.'8 2 In Carroll, the Supreme
Court held that blanket, warrantless car searches were unreasonable
unless supported by some individualized suspicion, primarily probable
cause.' 8 3 The Carroll Court supported this holding with the proposi-
tion that the government could not substitute evenhanded treatment
for the requirement of individualized suspicion. 184 Justice O'Connor
bolstered the Carroll holding by arguing that the Warrant Clause of
the Constitution illustrates that the Fourth Amendment Framers
chose to curb the potential abuses of general searches, not by an even-
handedness requirement, but rather by raising the required level of
individualized suspicion to one of objective probable cause.'8 5 There-
fore, Justice O'Connor stated, protection of privacy, rather than even-
handedness, is the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment. 186 Further,
the search of a person is one of only four categories that the Constitu-
tion mentions by name as requiring heightened protection. 187
Justice O'Connor continued with a discussion of the proposition
that urinalysis testing is "particularly destructive of privacy and offen-
180 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2398 (1995) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
181 Id. at 2698 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
182 Id. at 2698-99 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
183 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149-54 (1925).
184 Id.
185 Vernania Sch. Dist. 47J, 115 S. Ct. at 2399 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). In support of
this proposition, O'Connor cites to Thomas K. Clancy, The Role of Individualized Suspicion in
Assessing the Reasonablness of Searches and Seizures, 25 MEM. ST. U. L Ruv. 483, 489 (1994)
("While the plain language of the [Fourth] Amendment does not mandate individualized
suspicion as a necessary component of all searches and seizures, the historical record dem-
onstrates that the framers believed that individualized suspicion was an inherent quality of
reasonable searches and seizures.").
186 Venonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 115 S. Ct. at 2399-400 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
187 Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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sive to personal dignity." 88 Justice O'Connor stated further that the
Court has invoked the Fourth Amendment against less intrusive
searches than urinalysis testing. 89
Justice O'Connor conceded that, outside of the criminal context,
the Supreme Court has upheld some evenhanded, blanket searches
after balancing the invasion of privacy against the governmental need
served by the policy.' 90 Most of these cases, however, involved
searches that were either not personally intrusive,' 9 ' or that arose in
unique contexts such as prisons. 92 Moreover, Justice O'Connor
stated that, in all of the cases where the Court affirmed such warrant-
less searches, it did so only after first reiterating the Fourth Amend-
ment's long-standing preference for suspicion-based searches.' 93
After such an affirmation, the Court ultimately found that, in those
particular cases, such searches were infeasible or ineffectual due to
unusual circumstances.' 94 Justice O'Connor proceeded to distinguish
the applicability of Skinner. While requiring suspicion-based testing of
railway workers would be unworkable given that the scene of a serious
train accident is chaotic, Justice O'Connor argued that such un-
workability is not present with student drug testing.'9 5
Furthermore, Justice O'Connor argued that prior cases uphold-
ing suspicionless drug testing involved situations in which "one unde-
tected instance of wrongdoing could have injurious consequences for
a great number of people."' 96 According to Justice O'Connor, the
governmental interests at stake for the Vernonia School District are
188 Id. at 2400 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing National Treasury Employees Union v.
Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 680 (1989)).
189 Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 295 (1973) (Stewart,J.) (characterizing the scraping
of dirt from under an individual's fingernails as a "severe, though brief, intrusion upon
cherished personal security").
190 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 115 S. Ct. at 2400 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
191 New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 699-703 (1987) (holding that a search of a closely
regulated business was constitutional).
192 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558-60 (1979) (upholding visual body cavity searches in
prison).
193 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 115 S. Ct. at 2401 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
194 Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor cited Skinner v. National Railway
Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 624 (1989). The Skinner court noted that, "[i]n
limited circumstances where the privacy interests implicated by the search are minimal,
and where an important governmental interest furthered by the intrusion would be placed
in jeopardy by a requirement of individualized suspicion, a search may be reasonable de-
spite the absence of such suspicion." Id.
195 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 631.
196 Id. at 628 (one instance of drug abuse can lead to a disastrous train accident); Na-
tional Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 670 (1989) (one drug-im-
paired customs official, because of his impairment, may be susceptible to bribes or
indifference resulting in the noninterdiction of a "sizable drug shipment," which can in-




3. Application of Skinner Balancing Test
In the second half of her dissent, Justice O'Connor criticized the
majority's application of the Skinner balancing test to the Vernonia
School District Policy.' 97Justice O'Connor stated that, in applying the
Skinner test, the majority cited invalid reasons for not requiring a sus-
picion-based testing program. Most notably, Justice O'Connor re-
ferred to T.L.O., where the Court held that the required level of
suspicion in the school context is reasonable suspicion. 198 Finally, Jus-
tice O'Connor criticized the District's concern about the adversarial
nature of a suspicion-based program as unwarranted given the many
adversarial, disciplinary schemes already in operation at schools. 199
Justice O'Connor further criticized the majority for refusing to
seriously consider the practicality of a suspicion-based policy, a refusal
which stems from the majority misconstruing the fundamental role of
the individualized suspicion requirement in the Fourth Amendment
context.200 In fact, Justice O'Connor argued, of all the conceivable
contexts, a school would seem to be an ideal place for a suspicion-
based requirement to succeed because the entire pool of potential
subjects - students - are under constant supervision by school ad-
ministrators.201 Justice O'Connor stated that, ironically, the very evi-
dence adduced in support of the District's blanket search Policy, such
as the first- and second-hand stories of particularly identified students
acting in manners that would clearly give rise to "reasonable suspi-
cion" for the purposes of a drug-related search in accordance with
T.L. 0., concretely supports the practicality of searches based on indi-
vidualized suspicion. 20 2
Justice O'Connor also disagreed with the majority's assessment
that the Fourth Amendment is more lenient with school searches than
with searches in other contexts. 203 Justice O'Connor conceded that
this is, in some sense, true because school officials act in loco parentis
197 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J 115 S. Ct. at 2402 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
198 NewJersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 345-46 (1985).
199 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47, 115 S. Ct. at 2402 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice
O'Connor cited portions of the Vernonia School District's handbook which contains many
references to "problem areas" necessitating "sanctions" including, "Defiance of Authority,"
"Disorderly or Disruptive Conduct Including Foul Language," "Mischief," "Recklessly En-
dangering," as well as references to "Responsibilities of Schools" including "to provide fair
and reasonable standards of conduct and to enforce those standards through appropriate
disciplinary action."
200 Id. at 2403 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
201 Id. (O'Connor, J, dissenting).
202 Id. (O'ConnorJ, dissenting).
203 Id. at 2404 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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and, thus, necessitate a degree of constitutional leeway.20 4 Justice
O'Connor added, however, that the tradition of constitutional leeway
applies when school officials respond to particularized wrongdoing,
rather than with blanket searches.20 5 Justice O'Connor noted that
many of the cases cited by the majority support a notion of particular-
ized wrongdoing rather than a blanket search policy and are therefore
distinguishable.20 6
Justice O'Connor continued her criticism of the majority by at-
tacking the idea that a school's requirement of physical examinations
is similar to a requirement of random urinalysis testing.207 Physical
examinations are not searches for anything specific, so there is noth-
ing about which to be suspicious. 2 0 8 Moreover, the practicability of a
suspicion requirement for physical examinations is doubtful because
these examinations search for medical conditions such as diabetes or
heart defects that do not ordinarily manifest themselves in observable
behavior as does illegal drug use.20 9 Finally, Justice O'Connor stated
that physical examinations are entirely nonaccusatory and have no pu-
nitive consequences, whereas "any testing program that searches for
conditions plainly reflecting serious wrongdoing can never be made
wholly nonaccusatory from the student's perspective."2 10
4. Evidentiary Record
In the final section of her dissent, Justice O'Connor stated that
even if she were to concede the reasonableness of random drug test-
ing, she nevertheless saw two significant flaws in the District's Pol-
icy.211 First,Justice O'Connor maintained that the record reveals only
one piece of scant evidence corroborating the alleged drug problem
atJames Acton's grade school.212 Second, Justice O'Connor found it
unreasonable that the District chose to target student athletes, and
she suggested that the District made this choice so that the Policy
204 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 115 S. Ct. at 2403 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
205 Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
206 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (leeway in investigating particularized
wrongdoing); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (leeway in punishing particularized
wrongdoing); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (leeway in choosing procedures by which
to punish particularized wrongdoing).
207 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J 115 S. Ct. at 2405 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
208 Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
209 Id- (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
210 Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
211 Id. at 2406 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
212 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 115 S. Ct. at 2405 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice
O'Connor says the only reference to a grade school problem comes in the form of a "guar-
antee" by the grade school principal that the District's problems did not begin at the high
school level, but rather started in elementary school. Id.
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would pass constitutional muster.21 3 Because of the weak evidence
supporting a drug-related sports injury problem specifically, Justice
O'Connor regarded the general drug problem within the District to
be the primary impetus for the Policy.2 14 Based upon the record, Jus-
tice O'Connor concluded that the District could have more reason-
ably focused on the group of students who violated school rules by
disrupting class.21 5
• Justice O'Connor ended her dissent by iterating that, "the great-
est threats to our constitutional freedoms come in times of crisis," inti-
mating that the majority's concerns with the drug crisis as a
nationwide problem obscured their assessment of the facts on the rec-
ord.2 16 This led Justice O'Connor to conclude that the breadth and
imprecision of the District's Policy rendered it unreasonable under
the Fourth Amendment.2 17
V. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court's decision in Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton
impermissibly transgresses the constitutional boundaries of the
Fourth Amendment. The Court's holding contravenes decades of
compelling precedent and opens the door for the future relaxation of
Constitutional parameters. If the Court had adhered to its prior deci-
sions in Skinner and Von Raab, as well as other decisions involving
Fourth Amendment issues in public schools, it would have held that
the District's interest in addressing the perceived drug "problem" did
not override student athletes' privacy interests, rendering its Policy
unconstitutional.
In the evolution of standards for Fourth Amendment searches,
the Court has enforced a requirement of individualized suspicion in
all but the most extreme situations.2 1 8 Given this precedent, the Dis-
trict's goal of addressing student drug use did not rise to the level of a
"compelling" interest for Fourth Amendment purposes. Moreover,
targeting student athletes is an ineffective means for establishing the
goal of a drug-free school, especially considering the existence of via-
ble alternatives to random drug testing. Participation in extracurricu-
lar athletics and accordance with rules of conduct do not significantly
diminish high school students' privacy interests. Finally, the Court's
decision in Vernonia attempts to fulfill overreaching policy concerns of
213 Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
214 Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
215 Id. (O'Connor, J, dissenting).
216 Id. at 2407. (O'ConnorJ, dissenting).
217 Id. (O'Connor, J, dissenting).
218 See discussion supra at section II.D.
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combating our nation's drug problem through impermissible means:
the virtual eradication of students' Fourth Amendment rights.
A. THE STANDARD OF INDIVIDUALIZED SUSPICION WITH FOURTH
AMENDMENT SEARCHES
As discussed in the Background section of this Note, in the evolu-
tion of standards for Fourth Amendment searches, the Supreme
Court has required individualized suspicion in all but the most ex-
treme situations, even with so-called "minor" cases involving relatively
unintrusive searches.219
Because individualized suspicion is an integral part of the Fourth
Amendment, the Court has only allowed the government to dispense
with this requirement in extremely limited circumstances. Suspi-
cionless searches are almost always prohibited in criminal cases. 220 It
is only in extremely "limited circumstances where the privacy interests
implicated by the search are minimal, and where an important gov-
ernmental interest... would be placed in jeopardy by a requirement
of individualized suspicion,"221 that a suspicionless search passes con-
stitutional muster.
Even if student drug use generally qualified as a compelling gov-
ernment interest, the Court mistakenly upheld Vernonia School Dis-
trict's random, suspicionless drug testing as a means to eradicate the
alleged drug problem. The Vernonia decision is contrary to the major-
ity of cases mandating that government actions in nearly all contexts
rest upon, at the very least, individualized suspicion, if not probable
cause.
222
Within the school context, courts have consistently stated that stu-
dents do not "shed their constitutional rights.., at the schoolhouse
gate."2 23 The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that,
although school officials enjoy some latitude in enforcing standards of
conduct, they must exercise this authority in comportment with con-
stitutional safeguards. 224 As the Court has stated,
... state-operated schools may not be enclaves of totalitarianism. School
219 See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560 (1976); Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
220 Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989) ("Except in
certain well-defined circumstances, a search or seizure in [a criminal case] is not reason-
able unless accomplished pursuant to ajudicial writ issued upon probable cause.").
221 Id. at 624.
222 See discussion supra at section II.D.
223 Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505 (1969). See also
West Virginia Board of Educ. v. Bamette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943).
224 Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975). See also West Virginia State Board of Educ.,
319 U.S. at 637.
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officials do not possess absolute authority over their students. Students
in school as well as out of school are 'persons' under the Constitution.
They are possessed of fundamental rights which the State must respect,
just as they themselves must respect their obligations to the State.2 25
Along these lines, the Vernonia majority incorrectly stated that be-
cause school officials act in loco parentis, courts owe them a greater
degree of constitutional leeway and should not hold them to the indi-
vidualized suspicion standard. This proclamation contradicts the
Court's prior discussion defining the relationship between school offi-
cials and schoolchildren in New Jersey v. T.L. 0.: "In carrying out
searches and other disciplinary functions . . . school officials act as
representatives of the State, not merely as surrogates for the parents,
and they cannot claim parental immunity from the strictures of the
Fourth Amendment."2 26 Therefore, in T.L.O., the Court squarely
held that school officials must fully comply with Fourth Amendment
strictures whenever they search students on school grounds.2 27
As interpreted in T.L. 0., the Constitution specifies that under or-
dinary circumstances, school officials searching a student must have
an individualized suspicion and belief that the search will reveal evi-
dence of wrongdoing. 22 8 Bare individualized suspicion, however, is
not enough. The T.L.O. Court further constrained the actions of
school officials by stating that an individualized suspicion requirement
can only pass constitutional muster if prompted by "exceptional cir-
cumstances in which special needs, beyond the normal need for law
enforcement, make the warrant and probable cause requirement
impracticable."2 29
Consequently, in order for the Vernonia Policy to pass constitu-
tional muster, the District must have tested only those students who
they reasonably suspected had used or were using drugs. Moreover,
even if the District could show "extraordinary" circumstances, T.L.O.
dictates it may not dilute students' Fourth Amendment rights any-
more than is necessary to preserve school order. Along these lines,
the Court has emphasized that, "where there is no finding and no
showing that engaging in the forbidden conduct would 'materially
and substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate disci-
pline in the operation of the school,' the prohibition cannot be
225 Gass, 419 U.S. at. 510.
226 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 336 (1989).
227 I& at 333-36.
228 ML at 350 (Powell, J., concurring).
229 Id. (Powell, J., concurring); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602,
619-20 (1989); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987); State v. Dubois, 821 P.2d




B. THE LACK OF A "COMPELLING" GOVERNMENT INTEREST
The Vernonia District did not have a "compelling" government
interest in adopting the urinalysis testing program in light of Skinner
and Von Raab. These cases held that governmental interests served by
a random suspicionless drug testing policy must be weighty and com-
pelling, such that the drug problem addressed by the testing policy
poses a substantial risk of harm either to the public or to national
security.231
None of the justifications for random, suspicionless testing enun-
ciated in Skinner and Von Raab exist in the public school setting.
School activities do not pose risks to national security or public safety
comparable to the inherent risks posed by customs employees per-
forming drug enforcement duties or railway employees contending
with heavy machinery and dangerous cargo.
Ironically, Justice Scalia dissented in Von Raab, having decided
that even the aforementioned job requirements of United States Cus-
toms Employees did not amount to a compelling government interest
for Fourth Amendment purposes.23 2 Justice Scalia stated that even
though customs employees carried firearms and dealt with drug smug-
glers, their possible drug impairment did not rise to the level of a
threat to national security or public safety.23 3
Lower courts have generally followed Skinner and Von Raab, con-
sistently holding that the government interest furthered by the drug
testing program must be "compelling," or "strong."2 34 Along these
230 Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969) (citing
Burnside v. Byers, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)).
231 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624; National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S.
636, 668 (1989).
232 Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 685.
233 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia expressed concern in his Von Raab dissent
that allowing testing for customs employees could lead to a snowball effect whereby the
realm of permissible drug testing contexts would expand exponentially: "But in extending
approval of drug testing to that category consisting of employees who carry firearms, the
Court exposes vast numbers of public employees to this needless indignity. Logically, of
course, if those who carry guns can be treated in this fashion, so can all others whose work,
if performed under the influence of drugs, may endanger others ... ." Id. (Scalia, J., dis-
senting) (emphasis added).
234 See, e.g., International Board of Electric Workers, Local 1245 v. Skinner, 913 F.2d
1454, 1462-64 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding that the government has a "great" interest in the
safety of the natural gas and hazardous liquid pipeline industry, therefore random urinal-
ysis testing of pipeline workers did not violate the Fourth Amendment); Harmon v. Thorn-
burgh, 878 F.2d 484, 491-92 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denie, 493 U.S. 1056 (1990) (approving
random drug testing of employees holding top secret national security clearances); Na-
tional Federation of Fed. Employees v. Cheney, 884 F.2d 603, 610 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert.
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lines, courts have declined to deem a government interest as "compel-
ling" for United States Department of Justice employees who prose-
cute criminal cases,23 5 county correctional officials who do not:come
into contact with firearms or have opportunities to smuggle drugs to
prisoners,236 civilian laboratory workers at Army Forensic Drug Test-
ing Labs,2 3 7 and police department personnel who do not carry fire-
arms or participate in eradicating drug interdiction.238 Clearly, these
case examples illustrate that the Court's standard for a "compelling"
government interest is quite high and not easily satisfied.
Several courts deciding cases involving student athlete drug test-
ing have similarly followed the guidelines in Skinner and Von Raab and
held that drug use among student athletes is not a compelling govern-
ment interest.23 9
Although drug-impaired athletes could arguably face a greater
risk of personal injury if they were to compete while under the influ-
ence of drugs, with the exception of a few extremely dangerous sports,
that risk is minimal.240 Furthermore, any individual risk does not jus-
tify elevating the government interest furthered by the Vernonia Pol-
icy to the level of a compelling national security or public safety
concern.
C. TARGETING STUDENT ATHLETES AS A MEANS OF SOLVING THE DRUG
"PROBLEM"
The District mistakenly targeted student athletes as a means of
denied, 493 U.S. 1056 (1990) (holding that the government has a "compelling safety inter-
est in ensuring that the approximately 2,800 civilians who fly and service its airplanes and
helicopters are not impaired by drugs."); Taylor v. O'Grady, 888 F.2d 1189, 1199, 1201 (7th
Cir. 1989) (approving urinalysis testing of county correctional officers with regular access
to prisoners and weapons); Thomas v. Marsh, 884 F.2d 113, 114 (4th Cir. 1989) (approving
drug testing of employees of a chemical weapons plant who "have access to areas... in
which experiments are performed with highly lethal chemical warfare agents"); Rushton v.
Nebraska Pub. Power Dist., 844 F.2d 562 (8th Cir. 1988) (allowing drug testing of nuclear
power plant workers whose drug-impaired judgment could produce such catastrophic so-
cial harm that no risk whatsoever can be tolerated).
235 Harmon, 878 F.2d at 496.
236 Taylor, 888 F.2d at 1201.
237 Cheniy, 884 F.2d at 613, 615.
238 Guiney v. Roache, 873 F.2d 1557, 1558 (1st Cir. 1989).
239 Moule v. Paradise Valley Unified Sch. Dist. No. 69, 863 F. Supp. 1098 (D. Ariz. 1994);
Brooks v. East Chambers Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 730 F. Supp. 759, 764 (S.D. Tex. 1989),
affd, 930 F.2d 915 (5th Cir. 1991); University of Colorado v. Derdeyn, 863 P.2d 929 (Colo.
1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1646 (1994).
240 Stephen F. Brock & Kevin M. McKenna, Drug Testing in Sports, 92 Dica. L. R,. 505,
568 n.452 (1988) ("[F]ew athletic performances, even if affected by drugs, endanger the
public. Hence, an interest in public safety rarely justifies involuntary, non-cause testing.
Sports is distinguishable on this basis from other public occupations .... A possible excep-
tion is automobile racing.").
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addressing the drug problem, and the Court incorrectly upheld their
Policy. Four factors support this conclusion.
First, there is extremely scant evidence of a drug problem among
Vernonia athletes justifying intrusive urinalysis testing.2 41 To quote
Justice Scalia in the Von Raab dissent, "The only pertinent points ...
are supported by nothing but speculation."242 The factual record
presents no concrete examples of drug-related athletic injuries. The
record consists primarily of teachers' testimony as to their perceptions
of a drug problem. The District's desire to address the national prob-
lem of school drug abuse does not sufficiently justify subordinating
students' Fourth Amendment privacy interests. Nor is a generalized
suspicion that drug use must be occurring because of the widespread
problems in schools sufficient to trump the Fourth Amendment. Jus-
tice Scalia himself urged this point in his dissenting opinion in Von
Raab: "[i]f a generalization suffices to justify demeaning bodily
searches, without particularized suspicion ... then the Fourth Amend-
ment has become frail protection indeed."243
Second, the fact that athletes may serve as role models for other
students does not justify intrusive urinalysis testing. The record con-
tains no evidence that the Policy, by arguably deterring drug use
among athletes, also deterred drug use among non-athletes.2 44 In his
Von Raab dissent, Justice Scalia sardonically argued against this sort of
symbolic testing:
What better way to show that the Government is serious about its 'war on
drugs' than to subject its employees on the front line of that war to the
invasion of their privacy and affront to their dignity. To be sure, there is
only a slight chance that it will prevent some serious public harm... but
it will show to the world that the Service is 'clean,' and - most impor-
tant of all - will demonstrate the determination of the Government to
241 The District was "unable to confirm even one drug-related incident in the sports
program .... The District concluded that drug use was commonplace in the classroom
because of disciplinary problems there. There is no evidence, however, of similar problems
on the playing field. It follows that, if students were taking drugs, they were not taking
them before competing .... Perhaps the most telling evidence of the extent of drugs in
the sports program before the drug test is the evidence that only two students, both in high
school, have flunked the test." Brief for Respondent at 6-8, Vemonia School District 47J v.
Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995) (No. 94-590).
242 National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 681 (1989) (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
243 Id. at 684 (ScaliaJ., dissenting). Justice Scalia supported this point with reference to
earlier Fourth Amendment decisions: "In Skinner, Bell T.L.O., and Martinez-Fuertt [the
Court] took pains to establish the existence of special need for the search or seizure - a
need based not upon the existence of a 'pervasive social problem' combined with specula-
tion as to the effect of that problem in the field at issue, but rather upon well-known or
well-demonstrated consequences." Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
244 University of Colorado v. Derdeyn, 863 P.2d 929, 945 n.30 (Colo. 1993), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 1646 (1994).
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eliminate the scourge from our society! I think it is obvious that this
justification is unacceptable; that the impairment of individual liberties
cannot be the means of making a point .... 245
Third, targeting student athletes for random drug testing is an
inappropriate means of deterrence because there is no evidence that
drug testing actually prevents drug use among athletes.2 46 Unlike
drug testing of government employees who face the daunting penalty
of losing their job if they test positive, student athletes who test posi-
tive are only required to either seek treatment or quit the team. In
either instance, they can continue to use drugs so long as they forego
athletic activities. Moreover, claims that disciplinary problems have
decreased since implementing the Vernonia Policy are inconclusive-
students may simply be taking greater pains to hide their drug use
because they are aware of the District's heightened observation. Fur-
thermore, the drug testing at issue does not test for the presence of
alcohol, the drug most often abused by minors, or steroids, the drug
most commonly used by athletes seeking to improve their athletic per-
formances.2 47 Hence, alternative substances exist for athletes seeking
to use drugs without detection. Thus, the District's Policy is constitu-
tionally unreasonable because its means of deterrence are not prop-
erly tailored to its ostensible goals.2 48
Finally, the negative effect that random drug testing has on the
relationship among coaches, school officials, and student athletes mit-
igates the magnitude of government interests at stake.2 49 The rela-
tionship between students and school personnel should not be on the
same adversarial level as the relationship between law enforcement
officers and citizens.2 50 Having teachers and coaches administer the
test rather than neutral third parties negatively impacts student-
teacher relations. The Vernonia Policy mandates the involvement of
coaches and school officials in its implementation structure. This de-
nies student athletes the opportunity to reap the benefit of a trusting
245 Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 686 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
246 Brooks v. E. Chambers Consolidated Independent Sch. Dist., 730 F. Supp. 759, 765
(S.D. Tex. 1989), aff'd, 930 F.2d 915 (5th Cir. 1991).
247 Brief for Respondent at 45, Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386
(1995) (No. 94-590).
248 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1969).
249 See University of Colorado v. Derdeyn, 863 P.2d 929, 941 (Colo. 1993), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 1646 (1994) ("[the drug testing policy] transformed what might otherwise be
friendly, trusting, and caring relations between trainers and athletes into untrusting and
confrontational relations").
250 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 349 (Powell,J., concurring): ("[o]fficers have the responsibility to
investigate criminal activity .... Rarely does this type of adversarial relationship exist be-
tween school authorities and pupils. Instead, there is a commonality of interests between
teachers and pupils .... The primary duty of school officials ... is the education and
training of young people.")
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and supportive relationship with their coaches because of their con-
stant apprehension about being selected for testing and the impact
that such testing could have on their athletic status.2 51 Allowing for
visual and aural observation of the athlete producing his or her speci-
men does not foster a feeling of trust in the student. The Policy is
therefore fraught with reminders to the student that his school does
not trust him to be honest and forthright when providing a specimen.
The combination of the District's suspicion and the athletes' embar-
rassment results in pervasive distrust. Such distrust destroys inter-
school relationships between athletes, coaches, and school
administrators.252
D. FAILURE TO CONSIDER ALTERNATIVES TO RANDOM DRUG TESTING
The majority in Vernonia incorrectly refused to consider the avail-
ability of viable alternatives to random drug testing within the
Vernonia School District.2 53 While the Skinner Court stated that the
reasonableness of a Fourth Amendment search does not necessarily de-
pend on the existence of less intrusive alternatives, 254 in several cases,
the Court has considered such alternatives.
In United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,255 the Court considered practical
alternatives to a Border Patrol officer's stop and questioning of a car's
occupants without probable cause or consent.256 The Court held:
Because of the importance of the governmental interest at stake, the
minimal intrusion of a brief stop, and the absence of practical alternatives for
policing the border... when an officer's observations lead him reasonably
to suspect that a particular vehicle may contain [illegal] aliens ... he
may stop the car briefly and investigate .... 257
Since Brignoni-Ponce, the Court also considered the existence of
practical alternatives in determining the reasonableness of a search in
United States v. Sharpe.258 Although the Sharpe Court expressed con-
251 Derdeyn, 863 P.2d at 941 n.25. The Derdeyn court stated that random drug testing
would negatively impact the relations between athletes and trainers: "CU's athletic director
testified that a 'common' and 'accurate' way to describe the relationship between 'the
trainers and their athletes' is that they are friend[s].' He also testified that the trainers
take care of 'the overall general well-being of the athlete ... not only physically but...
mentally.' However in describing her relation with a trainer after [testing], one student
testified . . . 'it was confrontational. It was untrusting . . . . Every time I come to the
training room, I have to prove my innocence.'" Id
252 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 349.
253 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2395 (1995).
254 Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 629 n.9 (1989).
255 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
256 Id. at 881.
257 Id (emphasis added).
258 470 U.S. 675 (1985) (holding that, where a Drug Enforcement Administration agent
diligently pursued his investigation without unnecessary delay, a twenty minute detention
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cern that investigating the existence of alternatives would allowjudges
to engage in "post hoc evaluation of police conduct," the Court held:
"l[t] he question is not simply whether some other alternative was avail-
able, but whether the police acted unreasonably in failing to recog-
nize or pursue iL"259
The school environment provides practical alternatives to the
Vernonia Policy that the District should reasonably have pursued.
The most notable and effective alternative would have been to compel
drug testing only upon reasonable suspicion that a particular student
was using drugs in accord with the T.L.O. decision. Such a policy
would have allowed the teachers who allegedly witnessed student ma-
rijuana use and the coaches who suspected drug use among athletes,
to take disciplinary action against these students without jeopardizing
the constitutional rights of non-offending students.260
E. STUDENT ATHLETES' PRIVACY EXPECTATIONS
One of the most cherished values for United States citizens is the
right to privacy, which Justice Brandeis memorably described as "the
right to be left alone - the most comprehensive of rights and the
right most valued by civilized men."26'
Under the Skinner test for assessing the reasonableness of a
Fourth Amendment search, student athletes' privacy interests far out-
weigh the Vernonia District's interests. Student athletes do not have
significantly diminished expectations of privacy that justify the
Vernonia Policy's intrusion into their realm of privacy. Furthermore,
the mere fact that every child must attend school does not trigger an
instant diminution of rights, and the school environment does not
mandate an automatic forfeiture of privacy expectations as does em-
ployment in some government settings.2 62 Therefore, the majority in-
of a suspect did not violate the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness standard).
259 Id. at 686-87.
260 Robert J. Farley, Jr., Note, Constitutional Law-Suspicionless, Random Urinalysis: The
Unreasonable Search of the Student Athlete - Acton v. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 23 F.3d 1514 (9th
Cir. 1994), 68 TEMp. L. REv. 439, 457 (1995). See also Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648
(1979) (where the Court held that the police could not stop motorists to check for unli-
censed vehicles without individualized suspicion of wrongdoing). The Court noted that
while these "roving spot checks" do help enforce the motor vehicle code, they nevertheless
are not "a sufficiently productive mechanism tojustify the intrusion upon Fourth Amend-
ment interests ... [g]iven the alternative mechanisms available." Id. at 659. The Court
stated that the "foremost" of these alternatives is acting on observed violations. Id. Like-
wise, the "foremost" method to maintain a drug-free school environment in the Vernonia
District would be for school officials to act only upon observed violations. Respondent at
47, Vernonia School District 47J (No. 94-590).
261 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
262 "There are few activities in our society more personal or private than the passing of
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correctly devalued students' privacy interests because of several faulty
assertions.
First, student athletes' privacy expectations greatly differ from the
expectations of employees dealing on a daily basis with the possibility
of train accidents, drug interdiction, and firearms. Consequently, the
majority incorrectly equated the privacy expectations in Skinner and
Von Raab with the student athletes' privacy expectations.
Skinner discussed the decreased privacy expectations of railway
workers stating that these workers realize that their safety-sensitive
jobs qualify them for drug monitoring because they "participate in an
industry that is regulated pervasively to ensure safety, a goal depen-
dent, in substantial part, on the health and fitness of covered
employees."263
The Court in Von Raab similarly emphasized that the job at issue,
by its very nature, diminished privacy expectations: "[u] nlike most pri-
vate citizens or government employees in general, employees involved
in drug interdiction reasonably should expect effective inquiry into
their fitness and probity."264 The Von Raab Court concluded that sus-
picionless searches were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment be-
cause the "Government's compelling interests in preventing the
promotion of drug users to positions where they might endanger the
integrity of our Nation's borders or the life of the citizenry outweigh
the privacy interests of those who seek promotion to these
positions. 265
Other Supreme Court cases have similarly concluded that certain
forms of public employment may diminish privacy expectations, even
when those expectations involve Fourth Amendment personal
searches. For example, the government subjects members of the
United States Mint to daily personal searches, as well as United States
military personnel and intelligence agency employees to exhaustive
inquiries into their physical and mental fitness.2 66 The reasoning sup-
porting such searches does not apply to schoolchildren, even if drug
impaired, because their daily activities do not have the potential to
threaten public safety or national security. Moreover, schoolchildren
urine. Most people describe it by euphemisms if they talk about it at all. It is a function
traditionally performed without public observation; indeed its performance in public is
generally prohibited by law as well as social custom." National Treasury Employees Union
v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 175 (5th Cir. 1987) affd. in part, revtd. in part, 489 U.S. 656
(1989). See also Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 617 (1989).
263 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 627.
264 Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 672.
265 Id. at 679.
266 Cf Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507,509 n.3 (1980); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733,
758 (1974); Committee for GI Rights v. Callaway, 518 F.2d 466, 477 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
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do not matriculate with the expectation that their school will subject
them to a similar level of testing as government employees in certain
contexts.
Second, the general school requirement of annual physical exam-
inations performed in a medical environment by a physician unre-
lated to the athletic program does not significantly diminish a student
athlete's privacy expectations, nor does it compare to random urinal-
ysis testing conducted in a school locker room by a school official.267
The Skinner Court stated that a urinalysis sample collected in a medi-
cal environment by an unrelated third party is similar to a routine
exam.268 Unlike the employees in Skinner, Vernonia student athletes
do not receive the benefit of this "medical environment ' 269 because
the District compels them to provide their samples in a school locker
room with a school official, who is anyone but a disinterested third
party.
Third, student athletes do not have diminished privacy expecta-
tions merely because they dress together in a locker room and shower
after every game. Because of its suspicionless atmosphere, the com-
munal undress in a locker room differs markedly from having a school
official watch a student urinating into a specimen jar.270
Finally, the fact that student athletes must follow rules such as
grade and curfew requirements does not diminish their privacy expec-
tations. The invasion of privacy associated with grade monitoring and
the like is nowhere near the caliber of invasion that results when
school officials monitor a student's most intimate bodily functions.271
The Court has stated that "[e]ven a limited search of the outer
clothing... constitutes a severe, though brief intrusion upon cher-
ished personal security, and it surely must be an annoying, frighten-
ing, and perhaps humiliating experience." 272  Schoolchildren,
especially adolescents, are often extremely self-conscious about their
267 See University of Colorado v. Derdeyn, 863 P.2d 929, 940 (Colo. 1993), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 1646 (1994).
268 Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 626-27 (1989).
269 Other courts have accepted this view, .tating that only when doctors frequently ad-
minister medical exams will these exams significantly affect an individual's privacy expecta-
tions. SeeDimeo v. Griffin, 943 F.2d 679, 682 (7th Cir. 1991) (stating that, if an individual's
job requires him to undergo "frequent" medical examinations, then that individual will
perceive random urinalysis drug testing as less intrusive). Many people and most school-
children have annual physical examinations, and the fact that Vernonia athletes have an-
nual physicals would not seem to put them in Dimeo's category of those who must undergo
"frequent" medical examinations. See also Derdeyn, 863 P.2d at 940 (stating that annual
medical examinations do not decrease the privacy expectations of college athletes).
270 Derdeyn, 863 P.2d at 941.
271 Id.
272 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1968).
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bodies and bodily functions.273 Therefore, the intrusiveness of moni-
tored urinalysis, certainly among the most extreme forms of Fourth
Amendment searches, upon adolescent privacy expectations cannot
be overstated.
F. INTRUSIVENESS OF THE VERNONIA POLICY
Justice Scalia incorrectly concluded that the invasion of privacy
under the Policy was insignificant. Three aspects of the Vernonia Pol-
icy make it highly intrusive. First, the Vernonia Policy heightens the
degree of intrusion on student athletes' privacy interests by requiring
students to urinate on demand.274 School officials take students to be
tested from class on the same day that their names are drawn, escort
them to a locker room, and instruct them to produce a sample. If a
student cannot urinate immediately, he must return later in the day to
try again.275 This requirement is a marked contrast to that in Von
Raab where officials gave employees five days advance notice of the
specific time and location for their testing, a requirement the Von
Raab Court gave some importance to in terms of reducing the overall
intrusiveness of the search.2 76
A second significantly intrusive aspect of the Vernonia Policy is
the District's requirement that monitors observe male student athletes
producing their urinalysis sample. This represents an extreme inva-
sion of the students' privacy expectations.277 Furthermore, this re-
273 Brief for Respondent at 27, Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995)
(No. 94-590).
274 Urinalysis drug testing is considered by many courts and legislatures to be so intru-
sive that it has been regulated in at least eighteen states and five cities. See Kevin B. Zeese,
DRUG TESTING LEGAL MANUAL s. 1.05[3], at 1-38 (release #13, May 1995). Three states
require an employer to have probable cause before he or she can compel an employee to
submit to urinalysis. Id. at 1-43. Six states and two cities specify that an employer can only
instigate urinalysis drug testing of his or her employees if he or she has reason to suspect
the employee is using drugs. Id. at 1-43 to 1-44.1.
275 At least one court has found evidence that some students suffer such stress while
standing at the urinal to produce urinalysis samples that they are unable to void their
bladder for two to three hours subsequent to the testing. Schaill v. Tippecanoe County
Sch. Corp., 679 F. Supp. 833 (N.D. Ind.), affd, 864 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1988). Moreover,
the Derdeyn court heard testimony from a student athlete that specimen production had to
be "done in front of someone else and.., in one day. Sometimes my friend and I would
be there drinking gallons of water literally after practice trying to go to the bathroom ... 
Derdeyn, 863 P.2d at 941 n.21.
276 National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 672 n.2 (1989).
277 The Schaill court placed great importance on the fact that students were only moni-
tored aurally, not visually, in upholding the urinalysis testing policy at issue. SchaiI 864
F.2d at 1318. In its brief, respondents compare the visual monitoring requirement at issue
in this case to a scene out of George Orwell's 1984 which involves a world where citizens
have lost all rights to privacy and where the government "Big Brother" constantly monitors
them through "telescreens" mounted on the walls. These screens are even in the
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quirement runs contrary to the testing policies at issue in both Skinner
and Von Raab, which did not require that officials observe the employ-
ees producing their samples.278 The fact that the testing monitors are
not impartial outside medical personnel but rather teachers, school
officials, and coaches compounds the degree of privacy intrusion.
This is an important contrast to the Skinner and Von Raab policies,
both of which required independent contractors or unrelated medical
personnel to administer the testing.279
A third intrusive aspect of the Vernonia School District's drug
testing policy is the requirement that student athletes disclose all pre-
scription medications to school officials before the officials administer
the test.2 80 This requirement compounds the fact that urinalysis test-
ing "can reveal a host of private medical facts about [an individual],
including whether she is epileptic, pregnant, or diabetic." 28' The Pol-
icy's disclosure requirement differs from the Von Raab policy, which
required the disclosure of licit drug use only after an employee had
tested positive for illicit drugs. Moreover, the Von Raab employees dis-
closed their medical information only to a licensed physician unre-
lated to the Customs Service.28 2
VI. MISAPPLICATION OF OVERREACHING POLICY GOALS BY THE
VERAONIA MAJORITY
Balancing the facts and the strength of the Fourth Amendment
precedent, it appears that the Court decided Vernonia SchoolDistrict 47J
v. Acton primarily for overreaching policy goals. No other explanation
exists for the Court's willingness to vastly expand the Fourth Amend-
ment balancing test from Skinner, as well as to ignore the sparseness of
the District's factual evidence supporting its "drug problem"
hypothesis.
Clearly, the "war on drugs" is a national commitment, and the
pervasiveness of drug abuse has reached into many of America's
washrooms: "[t]here was no place where you could be more certain that the telescreens
were watched continuously." GEORGE ORWELL, 1984, at 89 (1981).
278 Skinner v.-Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 626 (1989); Von Raab, 489
U.S. at 672 n.2. The Von Raab testing policy went so far as to allow employees to produce
their samples in the privacy of a bathroom stall.
279 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 609, 626-27; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 661.
280 See Loder v. Glendale, 34 Cal. Rptr. 94, 102 (Ct. App. 1994).
281 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 617.
282 Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 672 n.2. The policy at issue in Skinner required employees to
disclose at the time they produced their urinalysis samples "whether they had taken any
medication during the preceding 30 days." Id. at 626 n.7. It is unclear whether the policy
required the employees to specify which drugs they had taken. Significantly, however, any
disclosures were made only to medical personnel unrelated to the Railroad.
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schools. This problem alone, however, does not justify trespassing on
the Fourth Amendment.283 As Justice Scalia stated in his Von Raab
dissent: "the impairment of individual liberties cannot be the means
of making a point .... -284
In fact, it is precisely because the drug problem has reached such
epidemic proportions that courts need to employ added vigilance in
policing the boundaries of the Constitution. To quote Justice
Holmes:
Great cases, like hard cases, make bad law. For great cases are called
great, not by reason of their real importance in shaping the law of the
future, but because of some accident of immediate overwhelming inter-
est which applies to the feelings and distorts the judgment. These imme-
diate interests exercise a kind of hydraulic pressure which makes what
previously was clear seem doubtful, and before which even well settled
principles of law will bend.2 8 5
The Supreme Court does not achieve a solution to America's drug
problem by subordinating the intentions of the Constitutional Fram-
ers regarding basic principles of liberty and autonomy to the immedi-
ate concerns of drug abuse in our nation's schools.
Furthermore, the damage that a random drug testing policy
could do to impressionable students by forcing them to relinquish
their constitutional privacy right could very well be immeasurable. It
is vital that, in these troubled times, courts strive to reinforce constitu-
tional ideals rather than decrease their potency. Nowhere is this need
more pressing than in our nation's schools where the future leaders
are developing their own national and Constitutional identity:
"[s] chools cannot expect their students to learn the lessons of good
citizenship when the school authorities themselves disregard the fun-
damental principles underpinning our Constitutional freedom."286 In
283 See Skinner, 489 U.S. 602, 634 (Marshall,J., dissenting): "[t]he issue in this case is not
whether declaring a war on illegal drugs is a good public policy. The importance of rid-
ding our society of such drugs is, by now, apparent to all. Rather, the issue here is whether
the government's deployment in that war of a particularly Draconian weapon-the com-
pulsory collection and chemical testing of . . . urine-comports with the Fourth
Amendment."
284 Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 686 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
285 Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400-01 (1904). See also Skinner, 489
U.S. at 635 (MarshallJ, dissenting) ("[H]istory teaches that grave threats to liberty often
come in times of urgency, when constitutional rights seem too extravagant to endure");
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("[T]he
greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning
but without understanding.").
286 Doe v. Renfrow, 451 U.S. 1022, 1027 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also New
Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 373 (1969) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) ("Schools are places where we inculcate the values essential to the meaningful exer-
cise of rights and responsibilities to be a self-governing citizenry."); Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512 (1969) ("The vigilant protection of
1302 [Vol. 86
SUSPICIONLESS DRUG TESTS
order to preserve Constitutional reverence among a youth that is rap-
idly losing respect for many of the traditional underpinnings of our
society, courts must not assist in eroding what little respect remains
for the Constitution and the fights it provides. Children today are al-
ready greatly unprotected in the face of such threats as gang violence,
sexual abuse, and kidnapping. The Supreme Court made a grave er-
rorin assaulting one of the last vestiges of protection possessed by
children today: the Constitutional protection bestowed upon them by
their Founding Fathers. Winning the "war on drugs" will be a pyrrhic
victory indeed if it erodes the constitutional faith and confidence of
our nation's youth, the very group which this "war" seeks to protect.
VII. CONCLUSION
In Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, the Court held that ran-
dom, suspicionless drug testing does not violate high school students'
Fourth Amendment rights because the nature of the government in-
terest furthered by the testing was sufficiently compelling to override
students' privacy interests. This result contradicts prior Fourth
Amendment decisions allowing for suspicionless searches in only the
most extreme circumstances. Precedent confirms that the sole gov-
ernmental interest which is sufficiently compelling to warrant suspi-
cionless drug testing is either public safety or national security.
Moreover, extracurricular athletic participation does not significantly
diminish students' substantial privacy interests. Finally, the overreach-
ing policy goal of addressing America's drug problem primarily moti-
vated the Vernonia decision. No matter how noble the goal, the Court
improperly addressed it in Vernonia, which contained only marginal
evidence of a compelling drug problem. As school districts across the
country adopt drug testing policies sanctioned by the Vernonia Court,
they will do so at the expense of schoolchildrens' constitutional rights.
Such an Orwellian result is far too destructive to justify any incremen-
tal advancement in the "war on drugs."
SAMANTHA ELIZABETH SHUTLER
constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of American
schools.") (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 264 U.S. 479, 487 (1960)).
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